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THE PREEMPTION OF SHRINK WRAP
LICENSES IN THE WAKE OF VAULT
CORP. v. QUAID SOFTWARE LTD.
by MARY BRANDT JENSEN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the last several years, most mass-marketed software for
microcomputers has been sold with shrink-wrap license notices. A
shrink-wrap license notice states that the user of the software agrees to
the stated terms by opening the package or using the software. These
licenses are also known as box top licenses, tear-me-open licenses or
self-executing licenses. Since software companies began using these notices, commentators have questioned whether their terms can be enforced under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and contract law.'
In response to questions about the enforceability of shrink-wrap license
notices, Louisiana and Illinois passed Software License Enforcement
Acts. 2 Commentators then questioned the validity of these acts. 3 De* Mary Brandt Jensen is Assistant Law Librarian and Assistant Professor of Law at
the University of South Dakota School of Law.
1. See Davidson, Basic Contract Questions with Respect to "Box-top" Software
Licenses, COMPUTER LITIGATION 1984: RESOLVING COMPUTER RELATED DISPUTES AND

PROTECTING PROPRIETARY Rm. 329; Davidson, "Box-top" Software Licenses, BENCH & B.
MINN., March 1984, at 9; Einhorn, The Enforceabilityof "Tear-Me-Open" Software License
Agreements, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 509 (1985); Maher, The Shrink-Wrap
License: Old Problems in a New Wrapper, 34 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y AM. 292 (1987); Peys,
Commercial Law--The Enforceabilityof Computer "Box-Top" License Agreements under
the U.CC, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 881 (1985); Puhala, The Protection of Computer Software
Through Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1985); Raysman, "Shrink-Wrap"LicenseAgreements, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 1984, at 1; Reynolds, The SeVf
Executing License: A Legal Fiction, 2 COMPUTER L. REP. 549 (1984); Schwarz, "Tear-MeOpen" Software License Agreements: A Uniform Commercial Code Perspective on an Innovative Contract of Adhesion, 7 COMPUTER L.J. 261 (1986); Stern, Enforceability of Specijic Provisions Contained in Box-Top Licenses, COMPUTER LITIGATION 1984: RESOLVING
COMPUTER RELATED DISPUTES AND PROTECTING PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 343; Stern, Shrink-

Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the
Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51 (1985).
2. Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1961-
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spite the barrage of commentary on the validity of the notices, there
was no case law concerning shrink-wrap licenses or software license enforcement acts until the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
4
of Louisiana decided Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.
II.

THE CASE

In August of 1985, Vault Corporation, a California producer of data
protection software, sued Canadian-based Quaid Software, Ltd., a producer of copying software. Vault's data protection software is named
PROLOK, and Quaid's copying program is called COPYWRITE. Quaid
purchased some PROLOK diskettes, through the mail, which were accompanied by a shrink-wrap license agreement. 5 Quaid then developed
a program which could copy diskettes protected by PROLOK. The first
version of this program was developed by analyzing PROLOK with
commercially available analysis programs and disassembling and decompiling PROLOK. Eventually, Quaid developed a program capable of analyzing the functions of PROLOK without disassembling or
decompiling that program. 6 In its complaint, Vault stated that Quaid
had violated its copyright, contributed to other infringements upon its
copyright, violated the license agreement covering PROLOK, and misappropriated Vault's trade secrets. 7
The federal district court found that Quaid had not violated Vault's
copyright. The court held that Quaid did not violate the exclusive right
1966 (West Supp. 1987); Software License Enforcement Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, §§ 801808 (Supp. 1987).
3. See Snowman, Preemption of the Louisiana Software Enforcement Act by Copyright Law (or Suffocation by Shrink-Wrap), 8 CoMM. ENT. L.J. 163 (1985).
4. 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987).
5. The license agreement printed on the PROLOK packages stated:
IMPORTANT! VAULT IS PROVIDING THE ENCLOSED MATERIALS TO
YOU ON THE EXPRESS CONDITION THAT YOU ASSENT TO THIS
SOFTWARE LICENSE. BY USING ANY OF THE ENCLOSED DISKE'ITE(S),
YOU AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE
WITH THESE LICENSE PROVISIONS, RETURN THESE MATERIALS TO
YOUR DEALER, IN ORIGINAL PACKAGING WITHIN 3 DAYS FROM RECEIPT, FOR A REFUND.
1. This copy of the PROLOK Software Protection System and this PROLOK
Software Protection Diskette (the "Licensed Software") are licensed to you, the
end-user, for your own internal use. Title to the Licensed Software and all copyrights and prorietary rights in the Licensed Software shall remain with VAULT.
You may not transfer, sub-license, rent, lease, convey, copy, modify, translate,
convert to another programming language, decompile or disassemble the Licensed Software for any purpose without VAULT's prior written consent.... To
the extent the laws of the United States of America are not applicable, this license agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Louisiana.
655 F. Supp. at 753-54.
6. 655 F. Supp. at 755.
7. Id. at 752.
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to reproduce PROLOK, because there was no evidence that Quaid had
ever made a copy of PROLOK. Quaid merely loaded PROLOK into a
computer for analysis. Because Title XVII of the United States Code8
expressly allows users to load programs into a computer, the court
found that Quaid's actions did not infringe upon Vault's exclusive right
to reproduce PROLOK. 9 The court also found that Quaid had not violated Vault's exclusive right to produce derivative works, because a derivative work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work and
be substantially similar to the copyrighted work. 10 Because only thirty
characters of PROLOK code had ever been incorporated in
COPYWRITE, and no PROLOK code existed in the current version of
COPYWRITE, COPYWRITE was not substantially similar to or a derivative work of PROLOK. n
After finding that Quaid itself had not violated Vault's copyright,
the court further held that Vault had no standing to assert a claim of
contributory infringement. Vault's claim relied on the fact that Quaid's
software could be used to make illegal copies of software protected by
PROLOK. The court noted that this claim was based upon the potential to copy software that belonged to other copyright owners, not upon
the copying of PROLOK itself. Because Vault did not own the copyright to the programs which Quaid was allegedly helping others to copy,
Vault did not have standing to raise the claim. According to the court,
even if Vault had standing, no contributory infringement could have
been established. The court observed that a product does not infringe
upon another product's copyright if it is capable of "commercially significant noninfringing uses." Because COPYWRITE can be used to produce legitimate archival copies of protected software, COPYWRITE
8. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for
the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that
it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which
such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all
rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the
authorization of the copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
9. 655 F. Supp. at 758.
10. Id at 759.
11. Id at 758-59.
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does not infringe upon PROLOK.' 2
Once the court determined that there was no basis for the copyright claims, it turned to the claim that Quaid had violated the terms of
the Vault license agreement. The court noted that the license agreement in the PROLOK package was a contract of adhesion, which would
not ordinarily be enforceable in Louisiana without specific validating
legislation. Thus, the license agreement would be enforceable only if
the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act (the Louisiana Act)
was a valid and enforceable statute. The court stated, however, that the
13
Act would be invalidated if federal copyright law preempted it.
The Louisiana Act purports to make certain restrictions in software
licenses enforceable if the licensor retains title to the copy of the computer software. If title to the copy of the software is retained, the licensor may prohibit or limit any copying of the software for any purpose.
The licensor may also prohibit or limit the right to modify, adapt, translate, reverse engineer, decompile, disassemble, or create derivative
works based on the software. In addition, the licensor may prohibit or
limit rights concerning further transfer, assignment, rental, sale or
other disposition of the licensed copy of the software. 14 The court
found that the Louisiana Act conflicts with provisions of federal copyright law and attempts to extend the copyright monopoly beyond the
limits set by Congress. As a result, the Louisiana Act is preempted by
federal copyright law and unenforceable. 15
Title XVII preempts actions under state common or statutory law
which are based upon rights that are equivalent to rights covered by
federal copyright law.16 In addition, the Sears-Compco preemption doctrine invalidates actions based on state common or statutory law which
"clash with the objectives of federal patent [or copyright] laws."' 17 The
Louisiana Act permits a copyright holder to prohibit all copying and
thus is in direct conflict with federal copyright law, which allows copying for archival purposes and as "an essential step in the utilization of a
computer program."' 8 The provision in the Louisiana Act which allows
the licensor to prohibit the creation of derivative works merely provides
a right equivalent to the right granted by federal copyright law, which
gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to create derivative works.
12. Id at 759 (relying on Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984)).
13. Hd at 761-62.
14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964 (West Supp. 1987).
15. 655 F. Supp. at 761-64.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
17. 655 F. Supp. at 763 (relying on Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)).
18. Id. at 762.
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Furthermore, by allowing the licensor to completely prohibit reverse
engineering, by extending indefinitely the exclusive right to reproduce
copies of the software, and by providing protection for all computer programs whether copyrightable or not, the Louisiana Act conflicts with
the objectives of the federal copyright law.' 9 Since the Louisiana Act
conflicts with federal copyright law, grants equivalent rights, and attempts to extend protection beyond the objectives of federal copyright
20
law, it is preempted by federal copyright law and is unenforceable.
The court also held that the shrink-wrap license provisions were
unenforceable to the extent that they conflicted with the purposes of
federal copyright law. 2 ' Since the provisions in the Louisiana Act concerning copying, modification, adaptation, reverse engineering, and
preparation of derivative works conflicted with federal copyright law,
these provisions of the shrink-wrap license agreement were similarly
unenforceable. In these areas, Vault was limited to the protection provided by federal copyright law. If Vault failed to prove a copyright violation, it could not rely upon a breach of contract action based on the
22
terms of the unenforceable license agreement.
III.

IMPLICATION OF THE CASE

It may appear that the court's ruling in Vault would have little effect upon shrink-wrap licenses outside Louisiana. The Vault court only
turned to the Louisiana Act after noting that contracts of adhesion,
such as shrink-wrap licenses, are not enforceable in Louisiana absent
specific validating legislation. Most states do not take such a strong
stance against contracts of adhesion, and often the presumption is in
favor of enforcing contracts of adhesion. 23 Thus it appears that the invalidation of a software license enforcement act would have little effect
in a state where validating legislation was unnecessary to enforce contracts of adhesion.
The reasoning of Vault, however, extends far beyond the validity of
a software license enforcement act. Much of the reasoning extends to
the contract which the act seeks to enforce. If the act conflicts with
federal copyright law in seeking to enforce certain rights, then license
agreements which seek to enforce those same rights outside the bounds
of copyright actions must also conflict with federal copyright law. To
understand the full extent of the effect of Vault on shrink-wrap
licenses, one must examine both the general history of the preemption
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763-64.
See generally, Litvinoff, 6 LA. CIv. L. TREATISES §§ 194-95 (1969).
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doctrine and the history of preemption of breach of contract actions and
similar state actions.
A.

GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright statutes contained
no provision dealing specifically with preemption. 24 Because of the absence of such a provision and the long history of state common law
copyright protection for some works, the United States Supreme Court
declared, in Goldstein v. California,25 that state actions which
presented no conflict with federal copyright law were not preempted.
Although the Court in Goldstein found no conflict between the state
law in question and federal copyright law, it left open the possibility
that other state actions might conflict with federal copyright law and be
preempted.
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress changed the law of preemption by enacting a section dealing with the preemption of state law.
Section 301(a) states the following:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and cone within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished,
are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the com26
mon law or statutes of any State.
This provision is a clear statement of the intention of Congress to preempt the field of copyright law and overrules the Supreme Court's
holding in Goldstein.
Since the enactment of section 301, the courts have developed a two
part test to determine whether a state action has been preempted by
federal copyright law.2 7 First, the court determines whether the state
action attempts to protect or grant a right in copyrightable subject matter that is equivalent to one of the rights granted by federal copyright
28
If
law. If the court finds an equivalent right, the action is preempted.
24. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 301).
25. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
27. See Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 657 F. Supp. 70, 72-75 (W.D. Va. 1987); Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 614 F. Supp. 1100, 1119-21 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(on remand from 683 F.2d 808 (3rd Cir. 1985)); Schuchart & Associates, Etc. v. Solo Serve
Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 944-48 (W.D. Tex. 1982); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F.

Supp. 1090, 1095-1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
28. Id
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the court does not find an equivalent right, it moves to the second step
of the test. Under the second step, the court analyzes the state action to
determine whether it conflicts with the purposes of federal copyright
law. If a conflict exists, the state action is preempted, even though no
equivalent federal right is found. The state action survives only where
the court finds no equivalent federal right and no conflict with the pur29
poses of federal copyright law.

There is no longer any question that computer software qualifies as
copyrightable subject matter. 30 Thus, if the computer program involved
in the state action is copyrighted, the courts determine whether the
right asserted is equivalent to one of the rights covered by federal copyright law. The rights conveyed by federal copyright law include the
copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce copies, to prepare derivative works, and to distribute copies. 3l Federal copyright law, however,
limits these exclusive rights by granting persons other than the copyright owner certain limited rights such as: the right to sell or otherwise
dispose of a copy after the copyright owner has sold that copy;3 2 the
right to rent, lease, or loan a copy after the copyright owner has sold
that copy;33 the right to make copies of computer programs in the process of using them in machines; 34 the right to make an archival copy of
a computer program;35 and the right to make certain adaptations of
computer programs, as long as the adaptations are not transferred to
anyone else.3 6 Thus, any state action which concerns a right similar to
one of these rights or limitations, or which might affect one of these
rights or limitations, is a potential candidate for preemption.
While it may be relatively simple to list the rights which federal
copyright law grants, it is not a simple task to determine whether a particular right in a state action is equivalent to one of these rights. According to Professor Nimmer, a state right is subject to preemption if it
falls within the general scope of copyright, even if the precise contours
of the state right differ from those granted by section 106 of the Copyright Act.3 7 The fact that the state right is narrower or broader than
29. Id See also Snowman, Preemption of the Louisiana Software Enforcement Act by
CapyrightLaw (or Suffocation by Shrink-Wrap), 8 Comm. ENT. L.J. 163, 224-35 (1985).

30. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 117 (1982).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The other two exclusive rights, the rights to perform and
display the work publicly, are rarely the subject of copyright actions concerning mass
marketed computer software and, therefore, will not be addressed in this analysis.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
33. Id
34. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
35. Id
36. Id
37. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1]. See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 501 F. Supp. 848, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd 723 F.2d 195 (2nd Cir.
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the federal right will not make it immune to preemption. 38 Any state
right is equivalent to copyright, and is therefore preempted, if the act of
reproduction, performance, distribution or display creates an action
under the state right.39 If the state action requires additional elements,
however, which cause the state right to be "different in kind" or "qualitatively different" from the federal right, the state action is not
40
preempted.
B.

PREEMPTION OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND ANALOGOUS ACTIONS

1. EquivalentRights Test
Despite references in the legislative history of the Copyright Act of
1976 which indicate that breach of contract actions are not equivalent to
copyright actions and, therefore, are not preempted, 4 1 some courts have
found state law breach of contract actions to be preempted by federal
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (preemption is required when the state
law rights asserted are not "different in kind" from the rights protected by the Copyright
Act).
38. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1], n.43.1a. See also, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 131, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5746.
39. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.01[B][1], nn.43.1-43.2a.
40. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 501 F. Supp. 848, 852; 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1], n.43b.2.
41. The original draft of section 301(b) reads as follows:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to(3) activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106, including
breaches of contract, breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false representation.
H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The specific examples, including the language referring to breaches of contract, were dropped from the final language of the Copyright
Act of 1976. The House Report accompanying the final version of the Act, however, retained references to the examples, statingThe examples in clause (3), while not exhaustive, are intended to illustrate rights
and remedies that are different in nature from the rights comprised in a copyright and that may continue to be protected under State common law or statute.
The evolving common law rights of "privacy," "publicity," and trade secrets, and
the general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the
causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a
breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement. Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to contract
with each other and to sue for breaches of contract; however, to the extent that
the unfair competition concept known as "interference with contract relations" is
merely the equivalent of copyright protection, it would be preempted.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 132, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5748. For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history concerning the examples deleted from section 106, see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1] and Snowman,
eupra note 3, at 221-24.
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law. 42 In addition, courts have found that in some cases, claims based
upon theories of implied contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment are preempted. 43 This preemption may be a result of the similarity between these claims and breach of contract actions. Courts analyze
breach of contract cases under the same tests that are applied to other
state actions. These state actions are considered to be preempted under
the equivalent rights test if proof of copying, distribution, display, or
creation of a derivative work is sufficient to prove breach of contract. If
additional, qualitatively different, elements are required to prove
breach of contract, the state action passes the equivalent rights test, but
is still subject to the conflicting purposes test.44
An analysis of recent breach of contract cases indicates that the
mere existence of a contract or a promise not to breach it does not constitute a qualitatively different element for purposes of the equivalent
rights test.45 If a party to the contract makes a promise that is qualitatively different, however, such as a promise to pay for what is received,
the breach of the promise constitutes a qualitatively different element.
A failure to fulfill a promise to pay for goods or services, therefore, constitutes a qualitatively different element. 46 A breach of the promise to
pay is not usually relevant in shrink-wrap breach of contract situations.
In the typical shrink-wrap situation, the software user paid for the copy
of the software to which the agreement was attached. A software producer usually bases his claim of breach upon the failure to comply with
some clause in the shrink-wrap agreement other than the promise to
pay.
Often a software producer claims that the user violated the clause
limiting or prohibiting copying of the software. To prove that the user
breached this clause of the contract, the producer need only prove that
the user copied the software under a particular set of circumstances.
Thus, no extra element of proof exists to prevent the action from being
preempted under the equivalent rights test. The particular circum42. Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swartz, 657 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Va. 1987); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
43. See McNabb Bennett & Assoc. v. Terp Meyers Architects, No. 85 C 8792, slip op.
(N.D. Ill. June 19, 1986); P.I.T.S. Films v. Laconis, 588 F. Supp. 1383 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
44. See Acorn Structures, 657 F. Supp. at 73; McNabb Bennett & Assoc. v. Terp Meyers Architects, No. 85 C 8792, slip op.; P.I.T.S. Films, 588 F. Supp. at 1385; Weinstein, 578
F. Supp. at 1307.
45. See Acorn Structures, 657 F. Supp. at 74-75; McNabb Bennett & Assoc. v. Terp
Meyers Architects, No. 85 C 8792, slip op.; P.I.T.S. Films, 588 F. Supp. at 1385-86; Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. at 1307 ("Plaintiff cannot merely rephrase the same claim citing contract law and thereby obtain relief equivalent to that which he has failed to obtain under
copyright law.").
46. Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Scheinman, 645 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see
also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1] (the promise to pay the stated royalty).
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stances under which the act of copying occurred do not qualitatively
change the act of copying. 47 Only the scope of the right to reproduce is
affected. The fact that the state right is either narrower or broader
than the federal right does not make the state right qualitatively different.48 Thus, the circumstances under which the copying must occur to
constitute a breach of contract cannot prevent the action from being
preempted under the equivalent rights test.
Actions based upon a violation of license terms which prohibit or
limit the right to transfer, rent, lease or otherwise assign the copy of
the software to which the agreement was attached are preempted under
the same reasoning which applies to actions based on the copying
clauses. Transfers, leases and other assignments are forms of distribution and are often forbidden by shrink-wrap agreements. In order to
prove a breach of this type of agreement, the software producer need
only prove that the user sold, transferred, rented, leased or otherwise
assigned the copy of the software.4 9 Again, the circumstances surrounding the original transaction in which the user acquired the copy of the
software, as well as the circumstances surrounding the user's distribution of that copy, affect only the scope of the right and do not make the
breach of contract action qualitatively different from a copyright
50
action.
Clauses in shrink-wrap licenses which prohibit or limit the right to
adapt, modify, translate, or produce derivative works from the copy to
which the license is attached are also preempted under the equivalent
rights test. The act of adapting, modifying, or translating a work is the
act of creating a derivative work.5 ' Because the publisher must prove
only that the user adapted, modified, or translated the software in order
to prove a breach of contract, the publisher need not prove any elements different in kind from those required to prove the creation of a
derivative work under copyright law. As in the two types of clauses
previously discussed, the circumstances surrounding the original
software transaction and the act of creating the derivative work affect
only the scope of the right, not its qualitative nature. Thus, actions
based upon clauses prohibiting the right to adapt, modify, translate, or
produce derivative works are also preempted under the equivalent
rights test.
47. See Nation Enterprises, 501 F. Supp. at 852; Acorn Structures, 657 F. Supp. at 7475.
48. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1], n.43.1a. See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 131, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5747.
49. Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 750.
50. Id.
51. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09.
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Conflicting Purposes Test

Actions based on clauses which limit the number of machines that
the copy may be used with or the number of people who may use the
copy do not appear to be equivalent to actions based on any of the rights
granted by section 106 of the Copyright Act. Similarly, the rights under
clauses which concern disassembly, decompilation, and other uses of the
software do not appear to be equivalent to section 106 rights. Although
these clauses pass the equivalent rights test, they must also pass the
conflicting purposes test in order to survive a preemption challenge. 52
The primary purpose of copyright regulation is to promote the free
flow and use of ideas and to encourage creativity which will lead to new
ideas, products, and services. By providing adequate protection to authors, such regulation will create an incentive to produce.5 3 Traditionally, copyright laws have relied on the fact that the copyright owner's
exclusive right to reproduce copies of the work, distribute copies of the
work, publicly perform the work, publicly display the work, and create
derivative works provides sufficient incentive to create new works. In
attempting to give the copyright owner more protection than the copyright laws have deemed necessary, clauses concerning disassembly and
decompilation of the software restrict the free flow of ideas and the creation of new ideas, products and services. The additional protection
sought-the right to prevent reverse engineering-would provide
greater protection than that currently provided by trade secret law.
Only patent protection, which has much stiffer qualification requirements and a much shorter period of protection than copyright protection, allows so great a limitation on the free flow of ideas. Because
clauses which prohibit disassembly and decompilation attempt to provide a patent-like protection for a copyrightable work without meeting
the requirements of patent law, these clauses appear to conflict with the
purpose of the copyright laws.
Clauses contained in shrink-wrap agreements which regulate by
whom and under what circumstances a copy of a program can be used
also attempt to restrict the right of the owner or possessor to use the
copy. In contrast to patent laws, which grant the owner of a patent the
right to exclude others from using an invention, copyright law does not
give the copyright owner the right to prevent others from using a copyrighted work. 54 The idea that control over use conflicts with the purposes of copyright law is further supported by the refusal of the courts
52. Schuchart & Assoc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
53. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
54. 1 NIMMER ON CopYRIGHT § 2.18.
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to extend copyright protection to the utilitarian aspects of a work.a5
Restrictions on the use of copyrighted works appear most often in the
context of copyrighted designs, patterns, and architectural drawings. In
these areas, the courts have found that restrictions on use conflict with
the purposes of copyright law.5 Restrictions on use have also been addressed by the courts in the contexts of attempts to control the conditions of resale 57 and attempts to prevent incorporation of a copy of a
copyrighted work into another article.5 8 In both situations, courts have
refused to allow the copyright owner to control the use of a copy of a
work after the initial sale of the copy. Given the direction the courts
have taken in these situations, it is likely that courts will find that the
attempts of software producers to limit the number of machines on
which a particular copy can be used or the number of people that can
use a particular copy conflict with the policies underlying copyright
law.

59

IV.

CONCLUSION

The concept that federal copyright law preempts actions based on
clauses which prohibit or limit copying, further transfer, rental, leasing,
or other assignments of the copy of the software, the right to adapt,
modify, translate or create derivative works based on the software, dis55. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
56. See Acorn Structures, 657 F. Supp. at 70.
57. See Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 27 (2d Cir. 1906), aff'd 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
See also United States v. Masonite Corp. 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942); Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine, Co., 243 U.S.
490 (1917).
58. C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
59. Much of the analysis in this paragraph is based upon the "first sale" doctrine of
section 109 of the Copyright Act. If there has been no "sale" of the copy of the software,
i.e., if neither the transaction between the software producer and the software distributor
nor the transaction between the software distributor and the end user is a sale, clauses
limiting or prohibiting subsequent transfers or uses of the copy of the software might survive the conflicting purpose test. If there has been no "sale" and if the retention of title
clause in a shrink-wrap license retains title to the copy of the software, not just the
software itself, such clauses might be enforceable in a breach of contract action. It is unlikely, however, that all of these conditions will be met. Most commentators agree that a
sale usually occurs somewhere in the software distribution chain. In addition, many commentators believe that the typical shrink-wrap license transaction itself is a sale. For further discussion of the "first sale" doctrine in the context of shrink-wrap licenses, see
Brooks, Shrink-Wrapped License Agreements: Do They Prevent the Existence of a 'First
Sale'?, 1 COMPUTER LAw. 17 (1984); Einhorn, The Enforceability of 'Tear-Me-Open'
Software License Agreements, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 509 (1985); Puhala,
The Protection of Computer Software Through Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1985); Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed
Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 51 (1985).
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assembly or decompilation, or use of the software, completely destroys
the force of shrink-wrap licenses. Any legal force which remains is
probably of little use to software producers. It appears that after Vault
v. Quaid Software Ltd., there is little life left in shrink-wrap license
agreements. 6°

60. Shortly after the decision in Vault was published, Miscrosoft, a major software
publisher, stopped using a shrink-wrap license packaging format. Brownstein, Microsoft
Drops Its 'Shrink Wrap' License Package, Infoworld, June 22, 1987, at 13.

